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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD S. S2\NDERS and ELEANOR 
SANDERS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
DONNE. CASSITY, Trustee, et al., 
Defendants-Appellant. 
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Case No. 15515 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINTS Wh""EREIN IT IS ALLEGED THE SUPREME COURT ERRED: 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY ASSUMING THAT LEODA 
DUNHAM WAS A QUALIFIED HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, AND THERE-
FORE ENTITLED TO A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION AT THE TIME 
THAT APPELLANT'S JUDGMENT WAS DOCKETED. THIS ASSUMED 
FACT HAS NO FOUNDATION IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL NOR 
IN ANY EVIDE11TIARY MATERIAL SUBMITTED IN THESE PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
On appeal appellant argued that his judgment of May 14, 
1971, created a judgment lien on the property of Leoda 
Dunham which was not affected by Leoda Dunham's subsequent 
homestead declaration. In support of his position, appellant 
cited the court to Evans v. Jensen, 168 P 762 (Utah 1917), a 
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case which held that a subsequent change of status (becoming 
the head of the householdi after the lien attached to the 
property could not be used to defeat the existing mechanic's 
lien. 
In its decision filed October 13, 1978, this court ap-
parently in support of this position embraces the rule, as 
held previously in Evans, that a pre-existing lien cannot 
be defeated by a subsequent change in status which qualifies 
the land owner to take advantage of a homestead exemption. 
This court also referred to 40 AM,' Jur. 2nd Homestead Sec. 94 
Having adopted this standard., the court then stated: 
" •••. Dunham was qualified as head of the house-
hold and was entitled to the exemption before the 
judgment lien was recorded .•... " p. 3. 
In making this statement the court assumed a fact which 
is not before it and which is not in the record on appeal. 
The evidence of Leoda Dunham's status as a head of 
household is as follows: 
1. Pleadings - Leoda Dunham made her declaration 
of homestead on September 10, 1972, and recorded 
it on September 11, 1972. Nothing in the pleadings 
indicates that Leoda Dunham was qualified as a 
head of household prior to the date the declaration 
was made. 
2. Declaration Of Homestead (Part of Record on 
Appeal by Stipulation of the parties) - The 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
declaration states that Leoda Dunham's blind brother 
lives with her, without stating when he came to live 
with her, and further states that her husband is dead. 
Nothing therein indicates when she acquired the status 
of a head of household. 
This evidence does not support the contention that Leoda 
Dunham was a head of household on or about May 14, 1971, when 
appellant's judgment was docketed. 
Respondents have the duty to prove that the judgment lien 
of appellant did not attach to the remainder interest they 
acquired from Leoda Dunham. " 'He who sets up an exemption 
must prove it.'" Giesy - Walker Co. v. Briggs, 162 P 876, 878 
(Utah 19161. Therefore, because no evidence has been placed 
before the court to show that Leoda Dunham was a head of 
household at the time appellant's judgment was docketed, re-
spondents have failed to carry their burden of proof. 
For the reason that there is no evidence before the court 
upon which the court could base its determination that Leoda 
Dunham was a head of household on May 14, 1971, this court 
must hold that Leoda Dunham did in fact not hold such status, 
that appellant's judgment created a lien on her property 
which was not affected by Leoda Dunham's subsequent homestead 
declaration, that respondents acquired Leoda Dunham's remainder 
interest subject to appellant's judgment lien, and that the 
sheriff's sale to foreclose that lien was proper. 
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POINT II 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY PLACING A 
DUTY UPON APPELLANT TO CONTEST THE DECLARED VALUE OF 
THE HOMESTEAD PROPERTY OF LEODA DUNHAM, AS SET FORTH 
IN HER HOMESTEAD DECLARATION, AT THE TIME THE DECLAR-
ATION WAS RECORDED. THE IMPROPER IMPOSITION OF 
THIS DUTY WAS THE BASIS FOR THE COURT'S FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CONTEST THE DE-
CLARED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant argued that the lower court's determination as 
to the value of the homestead property of Leoda Dunham at the 
time she conveyed it was in error. He argued to this court 
that a trial should be held to determine whether it in fact 
had a value in excess of the homestead amount at the time 
Leoda Dunham conveyed a remainder interest to respondents. 
Appellant's judgment lien would have attached to any excess 
value over the homestead amount. Giesy - Walker Co. v. Briggs. 
This court held that appellant is estopped to question th1 
value of the property interests. The court said: 
" .•• any objection to the value stated should 
have been raised at the time Dunham recorded her de-
claration of homestead interest ... " p. 4 
In reaching this decision, the court referred to the fact 
that appellant's failure to question the value "in the earlier 
proceeding constitutes a waiver''. The court, however, does 
not indicate to what "earlier proceeding" it refers. 
There was no earlier proceeding! The record on appeal 
contains no reference to any earlier proceeding. It can only 
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be assumed that this court is referring to the sheriff's sale 
which was to take place on September 13, 1972, two days after 
Leoda ~unham recorded her homestead declaration. 
The first opportunity that might have arisen to question 
the value of the homestead property would have been the sheriff's 
sale of September 13, 1972. If the homestead declarant and the 
officer conducting the sale had disagreed as to the value 
of the property, then appraisers would have been appointed to 
determine the true value. U.C.A., 1953, 28-1-16. 
This opportunity to question the value of the homestead 
property never materialized. The sheriff's sale was never held. 
The record on appeal discloses no reasons why the sale was 
not held. Respondent's counsel has speculated upon oral 
argument before this court and the court below that the sale 
did not occur because of Leoda Dunham's homestead declaration. 
Appellants' counsel, on the other hand, represented upon oral 
argument to the court below and to this court his belief and 
understanding that the sale was cancelled due to a faulty 
notice. Nevertheless, this court should look only to the 
record before it, and that record discloses no reason. There-
fore, this court should not speculate that appellant was aware 
of the homestead aeclaration or that he had an opportunity to 
contest the value as set forth therein by Leoda DUr.tham. Further, 
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appellant had no duty to contest the value as it is the duty of 
the officer conducting the sale and the homestead declara1t1t to 
determine this issue. U.C.A., 1953, 28-1-16. 
Not only does this court err in supposing that appellant 
waived his right to contest the value of the homestead property, 
but its holding places an impossible burden on judgment credito1 
it fails to consider the probability that the value of the home· 
stead property will increase, and it invites abuse of the 
homestead act. 
The effect of this court's holding is that judgment 
creditors must contest the declared value of homestead property 
at the time a declaration of homestead is recorded or thereafter 
lose this right. In order to fulfill this duty a judgment 
creditor will have to continuously review the records of the 
County Recorder for the County wherein the judgment debtor 
owns realty, for if he should fail to discover that a home-
stead declaration had been filed at any time before a forced 
sale, he would be bound by the value of the property as set 
forth therein. This result would occur, under this court's 
decision, even where the homestead declaration had been filed 
years before a sheriff's sale is noticed and takes place. Thus 
an impractical and prohibitively expensive burden is placed 
on a judgment creditor by the court's holding. 
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The court's holding also fails to take into account that 
the value of the homestead property may increase above the 
amount of the homestead exemption. In the context of this 
case, appellant is contesting the value of the property at 
the time it was conveyed by Leoda Dunham, not when the declar-
ation of homestead was made. This court's holding prohibits 
appellant from questioning the value of the property at the 
time it was conveyed to respondents because he failed to 
contest the value when the homestead declaration was recorded. 
It does not take into account the possibility that the value 
of her property increased above the homestead exemption in the 
interim between the date the declaration of homestead was 
recorded and the date the property was conveyed. The possibility 
exists that such an increase would occur, but under the court's 
holding, a judgment creditor would be unable to take advantage 
of the increase if he failed to discover and contest the 
value of the property as set forth in the homestead declaration 
which may have been filed months or years before. 
Further, the court's holding encourages land owners to 
file homestead declarations disclosing that the value of the 
described property is less than the exempt amount when in 
fact it is not. Should a judgment creditor months, or years, 
thereafter seek to have his judgment satisfied at a sheriff's 
sale by executing upon the value in excess of the exemption, 
the homestead claimant could claim that the creditor waived 
his ·right to claim that any excess value existed because he 
failed to contest the value as set forth in the declaration. 
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The foregoing demonstrate the effect of the court's 
holding herein that appellant is estopped to question the 
value of the homestead property. It should be noted that 
appellant's first opportunity to contest the value of the 
property arose in the proceedings below whereat appellant 
showed the lower court that respondent's evidence of value 
was incompetent and self serving, and that a genuine issue 
existed as to the value of the property at the time 
Leoda Dunham conveyed the remainder interest to respondents. 
Appellant has not waived his right, nor should he be estopped. 
This court should remand this matter to the lower court for 
a determination of the value of the property at the time it 
was conveyed to respondents. 
POINT III 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS 
A MATERIAL ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL, I.E. WHETHER LEODA 
DUNHAM RETAINED HER HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION OR CONVEYED 
IT TO RESPONDENTS. 
This court held in substance that the property interest 
conveyed to respondents by Leoda Dunham was free and clear of 
appellant's judgment lien by operation of law because the 
value of Leoda Dunham's interest immediately prior to the 
conveyance was less than the homestead exemption amount. The 
court held that appellant waived his right to contest the 
value of the pro~erty, which holding appellant assigns as 
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error in Point II of this brief, If this court decides, upon 
rehearing, that appellant is not precluded from seeking a 
determination of the value of the property, then it should 
also modify its opinion with respect to the question of 
whether the homestead exemption was conveyed. In the event 
the property is determined to have a value in excess of the 
exempt amount, then the question of whether the homestead 
exemption was conveyed or retained by Leoda Dunham is material 
and must be answered. 
SUMMARY 
The Supreme Court should reconsider its opinion herein. It 
should recognize that it erred in holding that Leoda Dunham was 
a head of household at the time appellant's judgment was dock-
eted, and that this error led to an erroneous conclusion, namely, 
that appellant's judgment lien was defeated by her subsequent 
homestead declaration. It should also recognize that it erred 
in holding that appellant waived his right to contest the value 
of the homestead property by failing to raise the issue at the 
time Leoda Dunham recorded her homestead declaration, when in 
fact he had no opportunity to raise such question, and ~ven 
if he had, it would .have been raised prematurely since the 
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critical point in time was the date Leoda Dunham conveyed a 
remainder interest to respondents. This court should also 
recognize that it erred in holding that there was no need to 
determine whether Leoda Dunham retained or conveyed her home-
stead exemption, which holding was based upon the conclusion 
that the value of Leoda Dunham's interest immediately before 
the conveyance was less than the exemption amount, when the 
value of Leoda Dunham's property interest has not been determL 
Therefore, appellant requests that the court reconsider its 
opinion herein, and thereafter issue an opinion in accordance 
with the facts of this case and the law applicable thereto. 
Respectively submitted this 301 day of October, 1978. 
~OMNEY, NELSON & CASSITY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
136 South Main Street 
Suite 404 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
-:>/! I hereby certify that on this /L' day of October, 1978, 
I mailed 3 true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant'~ 
Petition For Rehearing and Brief In Support of Petition For 
Rehearing to Bill Thomas Peters, attorney for Respondent, at 
his office at Ti9bals and Staten, 400 Chancellor Building, 
220 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
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